Prior to life emerging, there is zero hedonic potential to be extracted. Once it does, that potential becomes theoretically infinite, only to collapse to zero when it ends. A lifetime is, therefore, the only window of opportunity in which pleasure can be extracted and pain subtracted. A rational conclusion would be to maximize the former and minimize the latter. The only question left then is "What is the optimal strategy to achieve that?" and that is what we will try to explore.
In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is.
Benjamin Brewster1
Theory
The kinds of ethics
Ethics is divided by the kind of questions it asks. Descriptive ethics asks what people value and do. Normative ethics asks what people should value and do. Applied ethics asks what was the right thing to do, and metaethics asks if there was even a right or wrong answer in the first place.
Almost every ism below is a normative theory, which means it tries to answer what people should aim at. Hedonism, egoism and altruism also have descriptive versions, which explore what people actually seek, and the two are easy to confuse: concluding that individuals chase pleasure does not mean that pleasure was the right thing to chase. Applied ethics is where a chosen theory meets a real decision. Metaethics is where existentialism and nihilism belong, since they ask whether any of those answer is correct.
The isms
Hedonism began in ancient Greece with Aristippus of Cyrene and the Cyrenaics in the 4th century BCE, who prized the pleasure of the moment2. It holds that pleasure is the only thing worthwhile and pain should be avoided at all cost3. The philosophical counterargument is the experience machine4, ch. 3. Imagine a machine that can give a person any experience they want for the rest of their life: floating in a tank, they feel unlimited pleasure and believe all of it is real. The choice is between that simulated life and objective reality, with its ordinary mix of pleasure and pain. If pleasure were the only thing worthwhile, the machine would be the obvious choice, since it offers more pleasure than any real life can. The argument assumes that people choose reality anyway. That is the contradiction: hedonism says the machine is the better life, most people turn it down, and so they must value something besides pleasure, such as doing things for real and being with real people. The assumption was untested when it was made in 1974, and surveys have since confirmed it: 84% of respondents in one study5 and 71% in another6 chose reality. The result depends on how the question is put. Told that they are already in the machine and may leave it, only about half choose reality7. A second objection is the paradox of hedonism: pleasure aimed at directly tends to escape8.
Epicureanism is a restrained form of hedonism: the best life is one of tranquillity and freedom from pain, reached by wanting less9. Epicurus taught it in Athens from about 307 BCE10, and it bears directly on the split between pleasure and gratification in the notes above. The everyday figure is the person who leaves a corporate job at 45 for a small house, a vegetable patch and the same three friends. They want little, so little can go wrong. The oldest objection came from the Cyrenaics: the absence of pain is the condition of someone asleep, and no positive good2. A later one is deprivation: a person can be harmed by the loss of goods they never feel the lack of, which is why death is bad for the one who dies11. On that view a life can go badly through what it lacks, even when nothing in it hurts.
Virtue ethics, also called eudaimonism, asks what kind of person to be. Its aim is eudaimonia, a flourishing life reached through good character12. It comes from Aristotle in Athens in the 4th century BCE13 and was revived in the 20th century14, 15. The everyday figure is the grandparent everyone respected: never rich, kept their word, turned up, treated people fairly, and had a full funeral. The first objection is circularity. The right act is defined as what a virtuous person would do, and a virtuous person as one who does right acts, which gives no guidance in a real dilemma12. The second is situationism: in experiments, circumstances predict what people do better than character does, so stable virtues may not exist16, 17.
Stoicism holds that virtue is the only good, that health, wealth and pleasure are indifferent, and that peace comes from attending only to what is in a person's control18. It was founded by Zeno of Citium in Athens about 300 BCE and carried forward in Rome by Seneca, Epictetus19 and Marcus Aurelius20. The everyday figure is the cancer patient who says the only choice left to them is how to spend today. Aristotle's objection is that virtue alone cannot make a life good, since great misfortune can ruin it13. A modern one is that love needs vulnerability: to treat the death of a loved one as indifferent is to have stopped loving them21.
Egoism comes in two forms. The descriptive form says every act is ultimately motivated by self-interest22; the normative form says each person ought to pursue their own good23. The descriptive form is usually traced to Hobbes24, with the classic reply from Butler25. The normative form was defended by Stirner26 and later by Rand27, and Sidgwick treated it as one of the three serious methods of ethics8. The everyday figure is the wife who leaves her husband when he loses his job, or the husband who leaves his wife when she falls ill, because the partner is no longer useful. Butler's reply to the descriptive form is that the satisfaction of getting something presupposes wanting that thing for itself, so self-interest cannot be the only motive25. Against the normative form there are two objections. It is arbitrary, since nothing about one person justifies counting their interests above everyone else's28. It also defeats itself, since the egoist cannot want others to be egoists too29.
Altruism is acting for the good of another person for that person's sake30. The word was coined in France as the opposite of egoism, with the rule to live for others31. Whether pure altruism exists is an empirical question32, and its modern applied form, effective altruism, grows out of an essay by Singer33. The everyday figure is the woman who covers every colleague's shift and never asks for one back, or the man who has coached the local children's football team every Saturday for twenty years, unpaid. The first objection is demandingness: the duty, as Singer states it, stops only where giving more would cost the giver as much as it helps the receiver33. The second is integrity: a life wholly in the service of others leaves no room for the projects and attachments that make it one's own34, 35.
Utilitarianism holds that the right act is the one that produces the greatest total wellbeing, with every person counted equally. It arose in Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries. The formula of the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers appears in Hutcheson36; Bentham built the system37, Mill refined it38, and Sidgwick gave it its most careful form8. Driver traces the history39. The hospital manager with one budget, who funds two hundred hip operations over one very expensive drug for a single patient with a rare disease. The main objection is the separateness of persons: adding up gains and losses treats society as one person, and one person's loss is not repaid by another's gain40. A related objection concerns justice: the sum permits punishing an innocent person whenever the total rises41.
Consequentialism is the family to which utilitarianism and ethical egoism belong: an act is right or wrong solely because of its outcomes42. The idea is old, and the name comes from Anscombe, who used it as a criticism14.
The everyday figure is the boss who gets results by cutting corners and bending the truth with clients. The integrity objection is that the theory sees no difference between what a person does and what they fail to prevent, so the agent becomes a channel for outcomes34. The cluelessness objection is that the full consequences of an act are unknowable, so its rightness is unknowable too43.
Deontology holds that some acts are required or forbidden in themselves, whatever their outcomes, so that duty comes before results44. Its source is Kant in 18th-century Prussia: act only on a rule that could be willed for everyone, and treat persons always as ends45.
The everyday figure is the referee who gives a penalty in the last minute of a final because a foul is a foul. One objection is that duties conflict and the theory gives no ranking between them44. Another is rule worship: when keeping a rule leaves everyone worse off, obeying it serves the rule and nobody else46.
Contractualism holds that right acts are those permitted by rules people could agree to, or justify to one another47. The social contract goes back to Hobbes24, and the modern forms are those of Rawls40 and Scanlon48.
The everyday figure is the divorcing couple who sit down and agree a custody schedule both can accept. The objection of scope is that only those able to bargain have standing, which leaves out children, animals, the severely disabled and people not yet born49. The objection of circularity is that judging what is reasonable to reject already assumes moral views47.
Existentialism holds that no purpose is given in advance, and that each person chooses their own and is responsible for the choice50. It begins with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in the 19th century and has its best-known statements in 1940s France51, 52.
The everyday figure is the banker who quits at 40 to become a carpenter: nobody told them to, and the responsibility is theirs. The objection is arbitrariness. If choosing is what creates value, no choice can be wrong and none can be criticised, and a choice has meaning only against standards that exist before it15, 53.
Nihilism holds that there are no objective values, so no objective function is correct. Nietzsche diagnosed it in the 1880s as the consequence of losing religious foundations54, and its modern philosophical form is the error theory55, 56.
The everyday figure is the teenager who asks what the point is, since everyone dies anyway. One reply is that the wrongness of cruelty for fun is more certain than any premise of the nihilist's argument57. Another is that an argument which removes moral oughts also removes the ought in 'one ought to believe what the evidence shows', and so undercuts itself58.
Negative utilitarianism makes the aim the reduction of suffering, with added happiness counting for less or for nothing. It was proposed by Popper59 and named by Smart60.
The everyday figure is the palliative care doctor, whose work is to stop pain. Smart's objection is that if only suffering counts, the best outcome is to end all life painlessly, so happiness must count for something60.
Antinatalism holds that coming into existence is a harm, so creating new people is wrong61. Its main modern statement is by Benatar, building on Schopenhauer62. It starts from the same observation as the notes above, that nobody is deprived of pleasure before they exist, and reaches a different conclusion.
The everyday figure is the couple who decide against children and ask why anyone would bring a child into this world. The first objection is to the asymmetry the view rests on: if the absence of pain is good with nobody there to enjoy it, the absence of pleasure should be bad with nobody there to miss it61. The second is that a person who never exists cannot be better off for it61.
Satisficing stands outside the isms. It is the observation that real agents search until an option is good enough and then stop63, which questions whether a life has an objective function to maximise at all.
The everyday figure is the friend who married the first decent person they met and is happier than the friend still comparing. The objection is that the idea collapses. If good enough takes the cost of searching into account, it is maximising under constraints64. If it leaves that cost out, it permits knowingly choosing the worse option for no reason65.
Practice
Theory asks what a person should optimise for. Practice asks what people turn out to have wanted once the time to optimise is nearly over. The closest evidence comes from people who are dying and from older people looking back.
In a national survey in the United States, 340 seriously ill patients were asked what mattered at the end of life, alongside bereaved relatives, physicians and other carers. All four groups put pain control, preparation for death and a sense of completion near the top. Freedom from pain ranked first, and patients cared more than their physicians about staying mentally aware66. When about 100 terminally ill patients in Canada and Australia were asked to record what had mattered most in their lives, 76% reported a heightened sense of dignity, 68% more purpose and 67% more meaning, and 81% said the record would help their family67. Among 153 hospice patients, regret about the life lived was related to how they faced death and to their emotional health68. The dying are also less bleak than the healthy expect. The blogs of about 600 terminally ill people were more positive than the writing of healthy people asked to imagine dying, and they grew more positive as death approached69.
Regret has been measured more carefully in ordinary adults. In the short run people regret what they did; in the long run they regret what they did not do70. Lasting regrets are mostly about the person one hoped to become and less about duties left undone, by 72% to 28% across six studies71. Time itself changes the aim. When time feels open-ended, people pursue knowledge and future pay-offs; when it feels short, they turn to emotionally meaningful goals and close relationships72.
Asked in their own words what makes life meaningful, adults in 14 of 17 advanced economies named family first, with work and material wellbeing usually next73. The longest study of adult life, which has followed 724 men since 1938 and later their families, found that the quality of close relationships predicted later health and happiness: those most satisfied in their relationships at 50 were the healthiest at 8074. Feeling good and finding life worthwhile also come apart. In a survey of 397 adults, health, money and ease went with happiness and not with meaning, while worry, effort and giving to others went with meaning75. That gap is the split between pleasure and gratification in the notes, under another name.
The claim that money stops mattering past a certain income has been tested, revised and partly withdrawn. An analysis of more than 450,000 survey responses in the United States found that day-to-day emotional wellbeing rose with income up to about $75,000 a year and then flattened, while satisfaction with life as a whole kept rising76. Worldwide data put the point of satiation near $95,000 for life satisfaction77. A later study that sampled people's feelings in the moment found no plateau at all78. The two sides then reanalysed the data together and found both partly right: the plateau exists, at about $100,000, for the unhappiest minority, roughly the bottom 15 to 20%, and for everyone else happiness keeps rising with income79. Income works on a log scale, so the step from $100,000 to $200,000 feels like the step from $25,000 to $50,000. Money removes misery more reliably than it adds joy.
What is remembered differs from what was felt. Patients who rated their pain during a medical procedure and again afterwards remembered the worst moment and the final moments, and ignored how long the pain had lasted80. There are therefore two candidates for the thing being maximised: the life as it is felt moment by moment, and the life as it is remembered and judged. A deathbed report is the second kind.
The drug addict is the plainest case of a life run on the feeling of the moment. They spend their own, their friends' and their relatives' last pennies to shoot up, disregarding any negative consequences of their actions for their health and the people that love them. Each choice has a gain and a cost. The first dose brings hours of euphoria with no anxiety and no pain, and ordinary pleasures feel flat beside it. Using again in place of going to work buys another high and costs the job. Spending the rent on the drug guarantees tonight and brings debt and eviction. As the effect fades the dose goes up and the pleasure goes down, until the addict uses only to feel normal. It is the ride-it-until-the-wheels-fall-off type of behaviour, and it is the paradox of hedonism in practice8.
This evidence has limits. The best-known list, the five regrets of the dying, comes from one palliative carer's recollections and has no sample, method or count81. Careful studies of dying people's own regrets are few, and most end-of-life research measures what patients want from care. The regret studies mostly sample Americans, and the two percentages on regret come from the university's summary of the paper. The long study of adult life began with men in one American city. The income figures are in dollars of their survey years, so $75,000 in 2010 is well over $100,000 today.
Set against the theory, the practice points in a consistent direction. Nobody in these studies reports wishing for more pleasure as such. Freedom from pain ranks first, which is the negative-utilitarian and Epicurean half of hedonism. Beyond that, people name completion, meaning, dignity and other people, which sit closer to virtue ethics than to hedonism. Money behaves like pain relief: it lifts the floor and does little for those whose unhappiness has other causes. The theory also treats the objective function as fixed, and the evidence on time suggests that it changes as the time left shrinks72.
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